independence. 6 It is more likely that the ancestors of the Kurds came from several sources; some firom Turkic, Armenian, or Assyrian tribes, but most probably from Indo-European groups. 7 While the Kurds have a north-western Iranian linguistic origin in common, they are separated by two major dialects with considerable local variation and a number of sub-dialects, which seems to make communication between the various tribes and regions difficult, though possible. Tribal structures have traditionally dominated Kurdish society and continue to do so to a remarkable extent A clear national identity began to emerge in a class of urban Kurdish intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century, but tribalism as well as regional and feudal loyalities stood in the way of its development on a broad scale. Thus, in practice, the Kurds never achieved unity in their struggle for independence against foreign domination, but remained always at least as much involved in fighting each other as combatting Turkish, Iraqi or Iranian troops. would have posed a threat to the security of neighbouring States, in particular Turkey.
There is reason to assume that this scenario and the unwillingness of the United States to commit its military to a presence of unknown duration in a country engaged in a civil war were key factors for the political decision not to go through with the campaign against Saddam Hussein at the end of February 1991.
14 The official reason given for the suspension on 27 February 1991 of 'Operation Desert Storm' was that the goal to push Iraq oat of Kuwait had been achieved. 13 Later it became clear that this decision allowed a large number of tanks of the Iraqi Republican Guard to escape to the north before General Schwarzkopf was able to complete his encirclement of the mass of Iraqi tanks assembled in the area west of Basra.
16 As a result, the Republican Guard, which had deployed almost half of its forces in the north of Iraq, remained able to function after the war. Thus, it appears that the domestic survival of the regime in power was preferred as a lesser evil, at least for the time being, to the carving up of the state of Iraq.
When in mid-March of 1991 the Kurds, following the lead taken by the Shiite rebellion in the south of Iraq, also rose in the north they were able to operate on the basis of an alliance called the Kurdish Front which had been principally formed by the two major Kurdish organizations, Jalal Talabani April 1991 to adopt a resolution to provide protection for the Kurds. There was opposition from China, the USSR and the United States who shared the view that this would create a precedent for the involvement of the Security Council in internal matters. 20 Various reasons for the refusal were put forward by the US administration, such as the unlikely success of insurgents in view of their lack of a central command, the absence of a mandate from the United Nations extending the objective of the operation beyond the liberation of Kuwait, and the President's reluctance to put the lives of American soldiers at risk by becoming involved in a civil war which had been continuing for decades. 38 This was declared to be a security zone under the protection of the allied troops and non-accessible to Iraqi forces. The Kurdish refugees were brought from the mountain slopes into this area where they were supplied with food and tents. Many returned to their own quarters in neighbouring cities. The occupation of almost 10,000 square km of Iraqi territory (extending some 100 km along the Iraqi-Turkish border and some 60 km south 39 ) by more than 13,000 soldiers from various countries, including the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Australia, lasted about 3 months. 40 The operation guaranteed 450,000 Kurdish refugees a safe return home. The last Turkish border camp (at Cukura) was closed on 3 June 1991.
41 According to US official figures, about 13,000 Kurds who had sought refuge in the mountains on the Iraqi-Turkish border had died before reaching allied 'safe havens'.
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At the same time as the creation of the security zone, UN observers were dispatched in the whole of Iraq in critical areas, including the Kurdish cities outside of the security zone.
43 But beyond humanitarian care, the role of the United Nations in the northern enclave remained undefined for some time. 44 In May 1991, negotiations between the United Nations and Iraq continued on the deployment of a small police force (of about 500) in the north of Iraq to replace the allied troops. 43 While the United States and the other allies were in favour of transferring their responsibility in the north of Iraq to such a UN contingent, Iraq at first resisted the proposal. In mid May there were positive signs that a preliminary agreement would be reached with Iraq, the main issues apparently concerning the size of the force and the question whether it should be armed.
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The Kurdish city of Dohuk, a provincial capital with about 380,000 inhabitants prior to the exodus of the Kurds, became a test of the effectiveness of the security provided to the returning refugees by the allied presence. It was not included in the security zone and the allies used their stand-off from the city as a bargaining chip in persuading Iraq to accept the substitution of the allied troops in the security zone by a UN contingent On 22 May 1991, an agreement was reached. 47 It provided for the withdrawal of Iraqi military from die city and its environment and for its deployment 10 km to the south. Furthermore, Iraq consented to withdraw its special police. Finally, the agreement permitted members of the allied forces to enter Dohuk to help restore public facilities. The commander of the US forces in the north later explained that the accord did not signify the extension of the allies' security zone.
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When Iraq finally agreed to admit a maximum of 500 'United Nations Guards', the UN immediately sent 10 officers from Geneva to Dohuk on 19 May 1991.
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At that time, the Kurdish part of Iraq was divided threefold. The security zone in the north-west was occupied and controlled by about 11,000 allied soldiers. Kurdish forces held a broad strip along the border to the east and the south, including several towns (Halabja, Qala Diza, Ranja, Rawandiz) and, surrounded Iraqi garrisons in other places. The remainder was under the control of the Iraqi army. 
III. The Legality of the Allied Intervention
From a purely moral and humanitarian point of view there seems to be little difficulty in welcoming the allied military intervention in Iraq to protect the Kurdish refugees. The assessment of the legality of the operation under international law, however, raises more complex issues. This is due to the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter which, at least according to the prevailing view, has also become part of general unwritten international law.
57 It is also relevant in this connection that the prohibition of the use of force overlaps with the principle of non-intervention in matters which are recognized by international law as being solely within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Leaving aside the question of whether the Government of Iraq after its military disaster was actually in any position to resist the allied action, in view of the lack of consent by Iraq to any violation of its sovereignty, the allied armed intervention requires some other legal justification. One consideration may be whether the intervention in Iraq could be based upon support for the self-determination of the Kurds. The principle of self-determination of people in contemporary international law is still to a large extent unclear in its precise scope and content. It is safe to say, however, disregarding the special practice relating to cases of decolonization, that it does not provide for the general recognition of the right of groups to secede from the states in which they reside. 61 Self-determination can be implemented by a sufficient degree of autonomy within the existing state structure. Indeed the Kurds in Iraq have primarily aimed for this objective, realizing that it is unlikely that they will gain independent statehood due to the interests of neighbouring states. Thus, immediately after the Republican Guard had recaptured the Kurdish cities, Kurdish leaders decided to enter into negotiations with 66 There were later reports from Western relief organizations that the Government of Iraq prevented the supply of petrol and food in order to exert pressure upon the Kurds to accept the Government's autonomy scheme.
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There are two main reasons -one legal and one factual -why the principle of self-determination, as applied to the cause of the Kurds, does not justify the allied armed intervention. As to the first, whatever the exact meaning of the right of selfdetermination, it does not justify third-party intervention in support of secessionist movements. In view of the central legal principles upon which the present international system is based, including territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of states, it has been correctly observed that It has been noted that Resolution 688 has no real precedent in United Nations practice, although there is some link to UN measures in the area of disaster relief operations.
83 While this resolution, in contrast to others adopted against Iraq, makes no explicit reference to Chapter VII of the Charter in general or to Article 39 in particular, it has been interpreted as evidence that the Security Council may adopt measures under Chapter VII with regard to an internal situation if a massive violation of human rights amounts to a threat to or breach of the peace, in spite of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. 84 A closer analysis of the statements made in the Security Council at the occasion of the adoption of the resolution, however, reveals that even those states which were supporting the resolution carefully balanced the role of the Security Council in this matter with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. 83 There is also no indication in that discussion that the resolution 'was understood to provide further ground for continuing economic United Nations Guards will be authorized to carry side-arms (pistols/revolvers), which wiD be provided by the Iraqi authorities (subject to the approval of the United Nations with respect to make, model, calibre and munitions). While it is not anticipated that all Guards will be so armed. United Nations guidelines and practices win be followed in this .regard. 9T hus, in requesting individual member states to contribute to the UN deployment the United Nations made it clear that only non-military staff could be considered due to Iraq's view that a military presence was not acceptable. 94 In June 1991, the UN Secretary-General emphasized that the 500 UN delegates designated to operate in the north of Iraq were not a police force, but served, as 'human witnesses', to induce the refugees to return and convince them that they will be secure even after the withdrawal of the allied troops from the north of Iraq. 
IV. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the allied military protective action in Iraq was noble and ethically sound in reducing massive human suffering, whatever its political motives and irrespective of the question as to why such action has been lacking in many other similar circumstances. However, the above analysis, which falls within the traditional framework of contemporary international law, shows that it is difficult to find a legal basis justifying the allied armed intervention in the Kurdish crisis. Schachter has made an attempt to build a legal case in support of the action by arguing, inter alia, that the Security Council had determined that there was a threat to international peace and security, that 'the internal strife was in some respects a consequence of the international military action, placing responsibility of a political and humanitarian character on the coalition to prevent massive attacks by Iraqi forces against non-combatants belonging to particular ethnic and religious communities', and that the allied action was limited 'to the necessary protective action for a relatively short period to allow for relief and the eventual return of the refugees' without seeking to impose 'an internal regime of autonomy or minority rights'. 96 While these are certainly highly relevant considerations, they do not overcome the obstacles posed by basic rules of international law to the unilateral (individual or collective) use of force outside the realms of self-defence within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. They would also beg the question of how to evaluate the corresponding responsibility of the coalition towards the plight of the Shiites who had rebelled in the south of Iraq.
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A discussion is required to determine if the traditional framework of international law needs a thorough reconsideration to allow the United Nations to have an effective role when gross violations of human rights arise and threaten international peace and security. In view of of the USSR's well-known persistent emphasis of the principle of non-intervention into domestic affairs of states, it is interesting to note that then Soviet Foreign Minister, Pankin proposed recently that the United Nations should amend the concept of sovereignty so that in future the international community could intervene in domestic conflicts. 98 Kurdish crisis may eventually give rise to the emergence of a new rule in customary international law, provided it can find general acceptance as a precedent outside of the peculiar circumstances of the Second Gulf War. It is more likely that the majority of states, especially the less powerful ones, will resent such a development The Kurdish crisis may also lead to a more active role for the Security Council in incidents of this nature, as has been cautiously suggested by Schachter
It is unlikely that most governments would approve a broad right of the United Nations to introduce troops for humanitarian purposes against the wishes of the government. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that the United Nations would invoke chapter VII, and its mandatory authority under Articles 42 and 48, in cases of human necessity when the territorial government is unwilling or unable to provide relief and protection. (...) In a case of this kind, the Council is almost certain to premise its decision on a finding that the situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security in view of its transborder implications."
The current conflict in Yugoslavia may offer a first test case for such Security Council action. However, the legal significance of the allied intervention to protect the Kurds for the development of international law will become apparent only in a long-term perspective. A more immediate practical issue meriting further discussion is how to strengthen the role of Secretary-General in dealing with the humanitarian aspects of such cases on the basis of the experience with the Kurdish crisis.
